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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Towards a Greater Understanding of the Antecedents of Dehumanization:
A Contempt-Dehumanization Framework
by
Fade Rimon Eadeh
Master of Arts in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Alan Lambert, Chair

Although dehumanization has been studied in a variety of conceptual and methodological
paradigms, surprisingly little is known about the role of affect as a mediator of the
dehumanization process. In this paper we propose and test a contempt-dehumanization model,
which stipulates that, the effect of severe norm violations on dehumanization is indirect, as
mediated by contempt (norm violation ! contempt ! dehumanization). Across three studies
we provide consistent support for this model in the realm of extremely immoral acts committed
by drug dealers who intentionally target young children (Experiments 1 and 3) as well as
unscrupulous Wall Street businessmen who deliberately scam unsuspecting elderly investors
(Experiment 2). We discuss the implications of our model for previous models of
dehumanization.

iv

INTRODUCTION
The process of dehumanization—denying a person or group its critical essence of
humanity—has been associated with some of the most tragic and truly horrific events in history.
For example, many acts of attempted genocide, such as those committed by Nazis against Jews,
were predicated on the premise that the targeted group was, literally, less than human. As David
Livingstone Smith noted in a recent interview on National Public Radio, “When the Nazis
described Jews as Untermenschen, or subhuman, they didn't mean it metaphorically…they didn't
mean they were like subhumans. They meant they were literally subhuman.” ('Less Than
Human': The Psychology Of Cruelty, 2011).
As a number of scholars have noted, however, the process of dehumanization can also
emerge in relatively subtle ways (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens, et al., 2003; Tam et al., 2007;
Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). For example, take cases in
which people seem to ignore a homeless person who is asking for help on the sidewalk. As
Darley & Latane (1968) show via the bystander intervention, there are many reasons that we
might not render help, including (a) failure to even notice him or her in the first place, or (b) the
perception that their plight does not constitute a true emergency. However, the decision to not
render assistance might, in some cases, be driven by a tendency to objectify that person, in the
sense that we treat him or her more as a “thing”, than a person. This does not mean that people
literally think of homeless people as subhuman. However, this represents an instance in which
we begin to see the person as somewhat-less-than-human, even if we do not literally conclude
that they belong to a different species. (For related discussions, see Haslam, 2006.)
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ON THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN THE DEHUMANIZATION PROCESS
One of the key features of dehumanization is a presumed lack of secondary “human”
emotions in the group or person that is being dehumanized (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, &
Suitner, 2008; see also Leyens et al., 2000). In other words, one important component of the
dehumanization process—denial of full humanity—may manifest itself in terms of inference that
“they do not feel the same emotions we feel.” As a number of scholars have noted, these sorts of
inferences may make it easier to inflict harm on the targeted group (Cuddy et al., 2007). For
example, just as people might attempt to legitimize the killing of certain creatures (e.g., insects)
on the grounds that such creatures do not experience the same kinds of feelings as experienced
by humans, a similar justification seems to underlie historical examples of horrific violence
against other people on the grounds that they, too, do not experience the same kinds of feelings
as do other human beings. Hence, affect clearly plays an important role in these models as an
important consequence of dehumanization: the inference that certain people do not feel emotions
in the same way as the rest of humanity.
On the Role of Affect as a Mediator of Dehumanization
Affect could play a different role in the dehumanization process, potentially as a
mediator. In this case, the focus is not on the kinds of inferences that people make about the
person or group that is being dehumanized (see above). Rather, the issue at hand is whether
affect as experienced by the perceiver is driving the dehumanization process. To anticipate the
discussion to follow, surprisingly little research has directly examined the formal role of affect as
a mediator, and one of the central goals of the present research was to gain more insight into
these matters. Unless noted otherwise, our use of the term “affect” along with related terms such
as “emotions” or “feelings” are referring the experiential state of the perceiver—the party
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engaged in the dehumanization process—as opposed to the inferred presence or absence of affect
in the targeted group.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that most (although not all) theorists have
indirectly or directly implicated dehumanization as an important precursor to violence and
aggression, especially towards outgroups. Moreover, as Haslam (2006) notes, dehumanization
often involves extremely negative appraisals of others. Hence, we are certainly not the first to
suggest that dehumanization is likely to involve negative feelings towards the targeted group (see
also Bar Tal, 2000). Nevertheless, a number of important issues remain unresolved. For one
thing, we are not aware of any formal, empirically based attempts to actually test mediational
models of affect in a dehumanization paradigm. As a related point, it is quite unclear what kind
of affect, exactly, would play this kind of mediational role. Of course, the affect would
presumably be negative in tone. However, different types of emotions are associated with
different types of goals and behavioral outcomes, even when they share the same valence
(Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Lambert et al., 2010; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz,
1990). For this reason, it is important to understand what kind of negative emotion would play a
role in mediating the emergence of dehumanization.
CLOSER CONSIDERATION OF THE HARRIS AND FISKE (2006) MODEL
A recent model proposed by Harris and Fiske (2006) merits additional attention, for at
least two reasons. First, more than most other dehumanization models, their model explicitly
emphasizes the negative feelings that people may feel when they are dehumanizing others. This
is clearly an important point and this underlying assumption is clearly important in our research
as well. However, it is one thing to argue that negative affect accompanies the process of
dehumanization but it is quite another thing to show that such feelings actually mediate the
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process of dehumanization. Harris and Fiske (2006) clearly make a solid case for the former, but
do not present any data that bear on the latter.
In addition to not testing/considering the formal role of mediation, their model is
somewhat unclear as to what kind of negative emotion, exactly, would be central to the
dehumanization process in the first place. In the introduction of their paper, Harris and Fiske
(2006) make a passing reference to the possibility that contempt (which reflects a blend of anger
and disgust; see Plutchik, 1980; 2001) may be central to the dehumanization process, but their
empirical focus is almost exclusively on disgust. In our view, we believe that disgust is indeed
central to the dehumanization process. Nevertheless, we believe that anger is critical as well. In
other words, dehumanization is likely to be driven not only by disgust, and not only by anger: it
is likely to involve both emotions.
Identifying disgust and anger as key, dual components of dehumanization is more
important than it might seem at first. This is because these two types of emotion, although
clearly correlated with one another, are clearly distinct and highlight two important aspects of the
dehumanization process. On the one hand, disgust clearly seems to capture the “debasement”
element of dehumanization, that is, that part of our perceptions that leads us to be repelled by
others. However, the feeling of disgust, alone, may not be sufficient (in a logical as well as
psychological sense) to propel people to commit and/or endorse violence and aggression. That is
the job of anger. In other words, in order to more deeply understand the true nature of
dehumanization and its potential consequences, it is important to acknowledge the role of anger
and disgust.
In suggesting that anger and disgust are both important in the context of dehumanization,
it is important to be more precise what this means on an analytic level. In particular, we assume
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that (a) anger and disgust are likely to be moderately-to-strongly correlated with another, that (b)
each of these two types of emotions, taken in isolation, could act as mediators of the
dehumanization process, (c) statistically controlling for disgust should eliminate the mediating
role of anger, and (d) statistically controlling for anger should eliminate the mediating role of
disgust and, finally, (e) other negative emotions, such as anxiety, should play no mediating role
at all.
To summarize, we see the blend of anger and disgust as central to the dehumanization
process and, to our knowledge, we are the first to formally test whether these emotions play a
central role in the dehumanization process. As such, our primary analyses involved a composite
measure of negative affect that was based on an average of several items pertaining to anger
along with several items pertaining to disgust. In theory, we could have referred to this
composite as the “anger/disgust” index but, in accordance with Plutchik’s theoretical model
(which explicitly defines contempt as a blending of anger and disgust) we use the contempt term
here as well. In the auxiliary section of our results section, we report separate analyses on anger
and disgust. As noted above, however, the effects of anger disappeared when disgust was
controlled for and vice versa, indicating that both components are central to the dehumanization
process.
Are Inferences of (Low) Warmth and (Low) Competence Central to
the Dehumanization Process?
One additional point of comparison with the Harris and Fiske (2006) model is worth
noting. According to the Harris and Fiske (2006) formulation, two important preconditions must
be satisfied in order for dehumanization to take place: those being dehumanized must be seen as
(a) lacking in warmth and (b) low in competence. This is an extremely important premise of the
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Harris and Fiske (2006) model because it stipulates rather stringent boundary conditions for
when dehumanization should, and should not, occur.
In our view, the stipulation that dehumanization can only occur when groups (or
individuals) are seen as low in warmth and low in competence is too restrictive. This seemed
especially likely in the case of competence. In our view, certain kinds of morally offensive acts
can trigger dehumanization, even though its members might be seen as rather competent. For
example, Americans often tended to see their opponents in World War II (i.e. Nazis and
Japanese) in dehumanizing terms, despite the fact that these groups were waging war on the
same level of technological sophistication as American troops. Consistent with this point, we
provide support for our model in the context of severe moral violations committed by a rather
competent group (i.e. Wall Street investors). As for warmth, we agree that perceptions of low
warmth (e.g. perceptions that the other group is “cold” and/or is lacking in likeability) can often
accompany the process of dehumanization. As we shall show, however, neither warmth nor
competence played a central role in mediating the process of dehumanization per se.
SUMMARY OF OUR CONTEMPT-DEHUMANIZATION FRAMEWORK
In this article, we introduce a new model of dehumanization and present three
experiments that were designed to test key aspects of that theoretical model. Our model
generally builds upon existing theoretical and empirical work related to dehumanization (BarTal, 1989; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005;
Leyens et al., 2001). However, our model is distinct in other ways, and offers several novel, and
empirically testable, predictions not offered by previous models.
According to our framework, as summarized in Figure 1, violations of moral conduct
(defined broadly) plays an indirect, rather than direct, role in triggering dehumanization. In
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particular, such violations are presumed to trigger feelings of contempt and these feelings are
postulated, in turn, to lead to dehumanization. Hence, although moral violations are certainly
important in the context of our model, contempt is hypothesized to play the most proximal,
causal role in driving dehumanization. As a related point, our model explicitly acknowledges
that dehumanization may certainly be associated with several different kinds of negative
psychological reactions, other than contempt per se. For example, violations of moral codes are
very likely to trigger a wide range of negative psychological reactions, including the activation
of generally negative attitudes, assessed as lacking warmth, along with certain types of negative
personality attributions. In the context of our model, however, it is the activation of contempt,
and not these other elements, that are presumed to trigger dehumanization.
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In each of the three experiments presented below, we experimentally manipulated the
severity of the moral violation by randomly assigning half of our participants to a severe moral
violation and the other half to a moderate moral violation. In two of our studies (Experiments 1
and 3), the experimental manipulation involved varying the severity of the crimes committed by
drug dealers, insofar as they were described either as targeting young children (severe violation)
or young professionals (moderate violation). In the other study (Experiment 2), the manipulation
of moral code violation pertained to whether financial investors were described as deliberately
cheating elderly pensioners (severe violation) or affluent couples (moderate violation). In all
three studies, we predicted, and found, that (a) priming a severe (vs. moderate) moral violation
would be more likely to trigger the activation of contempt, and (b) activation of these feelings of
contempt would, in turn, lead to increased evidence of dehumanization processes. In addition,
Experiment 3 was designed to provide evidence for the downstream consequences of
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dehumanization, namely, how the activation of these processes can have important ramifications
for behavior and attitude towards the members of the targeted group (e.g. increased support for
use of the death penalty towards the relevant violators).
ON OUR OPERATIONALIZATION OF DEHUMANIZATION
The Oxford English dictionary (2012) defines dehumanization, simply, as the process by
which one deprives a person or group of “positive human qualities”, a view which is generally
consistent with the way that previous researchers have defined this term. Note, however, that use
of Likert-type statements to assess the possible presence of dehumanization (e.g. To what extent
do you think of the member of group X as animalistic?) runs the risk of a demand effect, in the
sense that the use of dehumanizing language in the question, itself, might prompt participants to
see the target group in a dehumanizing way, even though they might not have otherwise done so.
For this reason, we were particularly interested in the spontaneous emergence of
dehumanization, that is, obtaining evidence of dehumanization that would emerge from our
participants, in the absence of any explicit or implicit prompts by us. To this end, our primary
measure of dehumanization was based on a paradigm in which participants were (a) first asked to
read about a target group and then (b) asked to complete a “word generation” exercise, in which
participants generate ten words that they think best described the target group. We then coded
responses in terms of whether the words generated did, or did not, represent examples of
dehumanizing language using a general definition of dehumanization that was consistent with the
conceptualization offered in the literature. That is, any given word was coded as dehumanizing
if it clearly seemed to imply the absence of positive human qualities.
When we began coding the words generated by participants, we quickly realized that the
construct of dehumanization is a fuzzy set (Zadeh, 1965). That is, like most other categories (cf.
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Smith & Medin, 1981), dehumanization is a not classically defined category with concrete
boundaries clearly delineating between what lies within vs. outside that category. This means,
on the one hand, that we were readily able to identify very clear examples of the construct (e.g.
vermin, garbage, trash, scum). These are clear examples of dehumanization because these are
(a) words that clearly refer to non-human entities (i.e. inanimate objects, or non-human species)
that (b) clearly implies that the group/person lacks positive human qualities (or, indeed, a sense
of humanness at all).
However, we also came across other examples for which reasonable people could
disagree as to whether they truly represented examples of dehumanizing language or not. For
example, consider the word immoral. This term may not necessarily fit the strict sense of
dehumanizing language because the phrase “immoral person” does not literally mean that the
individual does not have any morals at all, but rather, has a set of beliefs that are inconsistent
with what we would normally consider to be fair and just. It is important to emphasize that the
inability to make a clear delineation between words that are and are not dehumanizing does not
imply that the category somehow lacks meaning. For example, the construct of game does not
have clear boundaries, even though this concept is clearly meaningful to most people (cf. Zadeh,
1965). In the same sense, these considerations do not imply that the dehumanization concept
lacks meaning or that it cannot be studied in a rigorous way. Rather, it simply means that any
given coding system would need to acknowledge the inherent fuzziness of the underlying
construct.
Overview of Our Analytic Strategy
In light of these considerations, therefore, it seemed best to use an analytic strategy that
explicitly acknowledged the somewhat arbitrary “outer boundaries” of the dehumanization

9

construct. In each of the experiments to follow, therefore, we coded the word generation task
twice, using two different sets of criteria. In one coding system, we used what we refer to as the
“strict criterion,” coding words as examples of dehumanization only if it was very clear to all
three co-authors that these descriptors met the strict sense of dehumanization. On the left side of
Appendix A, we list all words that were generated at least once in the context of the three
experiments, and which we considered to meet this criterion1.
We then went though the data again using what we call the “broad criterion,”
categorizing words as “dehumanizing” if they seemed to capture some essence of
dehumanization, albeit in a general sense. (More precisely, words were designated as belonging
to the broad classification scheme if they engendered some degree of debate amongst at least one
of the co-authors). On the right side of Appendix A, we list words that were generated at least
once in the context of our three experiments and which we classified as belonging to the
dehumanizing category, under the broad criterion. (Of course, the broad criterion included the
words that were classified as examples of dehumanization using the strict criterion.)
As it turns out, we found a very similar pattern of results, regardless of whether we used
the strict or broad criterion. In our view, this represents a notable strength of our research
paradigm, insofar as this suggests that our findings are not an artifact of any single, and possibly
idiosyncratic, coding system. In order to show the generalizability of our findings across these
two operationalizations of our central construct, therefore, we report two sets of analyses, one
using the strict criterion, and the other using the broad criterion.
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of the first experiment was to provide an initial test of our contemptdehumanization framework. To this end, we randomly assigned participants to one of two
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conditions, one of which exposed them to an extreme moral violation, and one of which did not.
In the extreme moral violation condition, participants read about a group of drug dealers who, in
order to increase their profits, had begun to target unsuspecting young children by packaging
dangerous drugs in the form of candy and cartoon characters. In other words, these dealers were
not just selling illegal drugs to adults who wanted to get high, they were intentionally getting
children “hooked” on drugs by enticing them to buy what appeared to be merely candy. In
accordance with our model, we predicted, and found, that this sort of behavior triggered strong
feelings of contempt as well as the spontaneous emergence of dehumanizing language when
participants were asked to describe the group.
As in most types of designs, our study needed a control group to serve as a basis of
comparison to the experimental condition. In our case, however, our design was constrained by
two considerations. First, recall that a primary dependent variable in our research was the “word
generation” task, which allowed us to code for the spontaneous emergence of dehumanizing
language in the context of an extreme moral violation. Hence, it was necessary for the control
group, to engage in an analogous task such that they, too, would be asked to spontaneously
generate words that they considered to be a descriptive of a particular target group.
A second consideration is that it was important to show that the dehumanizing process
would begin to emerge in the presence of truly extreme moral violations, and not simply
dislikeable behavior. For this reason, and to maximize our basis of comparison with the
experimental condition, participants in the control group were asked to read a very similar story
about drug dealers, except that the story was slightly altered such that the dealers were described
as targeting young adults with so-called “designer drugs.”
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Hence, although the two versions of the description were very similar (and both described
a generally dislikeable group), one version contained an extreme moral violation and the other
did not. It should be acknowledged, however, that there was some degree of moral violation
even in the control condition, as the drug dealers in that condition were also engaged in illegal
activity. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, and in recognition that moral violations were present
in both cases, we refer to the experimental and control group with the labels extreme violation
vs. moderate violation, respectively.
Method
Participants
A total of 106 American participants (48 Male, 54 Female, gender was not reported for
four participants) were drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in a study on social
and political attitudes. Participants were compensated 30 cents for participation2.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two versions of a 300-word
newspaper article about drug trafficking geared toward certain target populations. This
newspaper article involved the illegal shipment of drugs from both Canada and Mexico and how
these drugs were targeted to particular segments of the population. The newspaper article also
spoke of the proliferation of these drugs around the United States, provided expert opinion on the
matter, and presented a dire view of the state of the drug war in the United States. The primary
difference concerned the groups (i.e., children or young adults) the drug dealers targeted.
Participants in the moderate moral violation condition read a story where drug dealers
targeted young professionals across the United States, with the dealers marketing their product
towards young professionals, with marijuana-infused organic food and ecstasy pills shaped like
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Hollywood celebrities. Participants in the extreme moral violation condition read a story where
the target group was young children, with the product being the pills resembling cartoon
characters, like Dora the Explorer. Participants were given unlimited time to read the assigned
article. As seen in Appendix B (which provides the full description of each version of the
article), the two passages were very similar, differing only in the group that was being targeted
by the drug dealers (young professionals vs. children).
Word Generation Task
After reading the assigned article, all participants completed a word generation task, in
which they were asked to generate ten words to describe the drug dealers from the story. The
primary purpose of this task was to code for the spontaneous generation of dehumanizing terms
(see below for coding procedure). Participants were specifically asked, “If you have ten words
to describe the drug dealers you had just read about, what ten words come to mind?”
Participants were given unlimited time to come up with these ten words and inputted these words
into ten blank boxes on the survey page under the prompt above.
Coding of Word Generation Task
As one might imagine given the kind of target group under consideration here, the
majority of participants’ descriptors were negative. Indeed, on the average, the proportion of
negative (as opposed to positive) words, out of the ten generated by each participant, was 75 %
In this midst of this (obvious) negativity, however, our primary interest was in the spontaneous
emergence of dehumanizing language. As we noted earlier, we coded for dehumanizing words
using a strict as well as broad, criterion (see Appendix A). More concretely, we constructed, for
each participant, a value on the strict criterion index, which represented the proportion of words
(out of 10) that were deemed to represent clear-cut cases of dehumanizing language. For
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example, if one of our participants had a value of .20 on the strict criterion index, this meant that
two of the words generated by that participant met the strict criterion of dehumanization.
We then went through the results of the word generation task again, constructing a looser
index of dehumanization, which now allowed for a word to be coded as dehumanizing, using a
broader criterion (see right side of Appendix A). (We operationalized words as belonging to the
broad criterion if these engendered disagreement among one or more of the co-authors as to
whether the term “really’ represented dehumanization or not.) For example, if one of our
participants had a value of .30 on the broad criterion index, this meant that three of their words
appeared either on the strict or the broad criterion.
Assessment of Emotion
Immediately after the word generation task, all participants were asked to “consider what
sorts of feelings you might be feeling right now, after having read the article.” Participants then
completed a series of 44 items, presented in a different randomized order for each participant:
interested, bored, edgy, happy, alert, irritated, satisfied, mad, upset, tense, sad, pleased, relaxed,
unhappy, angry, determined, irate, dejected, anxious, comfortable, jittery, nervous, worried,
confident, calm, disgusted, furious, outraged, infuriated, offended, riled up, incensed, fuming,
uneasy, fearful, distressed, terrified, startled, repulsed, hostile, revulsion, hateful, scornful, and
disdain. For each item, participants were asked to select any number between 1 (not at all) and 6
(very much so) that best represented how they felt toward the drug dealers in the story. On a
priori grounds, our primary interest was in forming a composite measure of contempt, which was
based on the average of angry, furious, outraged, disgusted, and repulsed, (alpha = .96).
However, given the threatening nature of the group in question, we also formed an index of
anxiety on the basis of an average of nervous, anxious, fearful, and terrified, (alpha = .92).

14

Trait Ratings
After completing the emotion measure detailed above, participants were asked to rate the
target group with respect to a randomized series of trait terms, including warm, cold, likeable,
friendly, sincere, pleasant, unpleasant, skilled, unskilled, competent, and incompetent. For each
of these terms, participants were asked to select any number between 0 (not at all) and 100 (very
much so). Although these trait ratings were generally expected to be informative, we were
particularly interested in using these ratings in order to form composite measures of warmth and
competence, two constructs that play a central role in the Harris and Fiske (2006) formulation.
Hence, we formed a seven-item composite measure of warmth based on an average of warm,
cold, likeable, friendly, sincere, pleasant, unpleasant, after reverse coding the negative items
(alpha = .88). We also formed a four-item measure of competence (skilled, unskilled,
competent, and incompetent), again after reverse coding as needed (alpha = .90).
Results
Affective Responses
One of the major predictions of our model is that the moral violation manipulation should
have a strong effect on contempt, with significantly higher levels of this emotion if the level of
moral violation was extremely high than if it was not. This was in fact the case, as contempt
was significantly higher in the extreme compared to the moderate moral violation condition (Ms
= 4.51 vs. 3.16), F (1, 104) = 18.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. Participants in the severe condition also
expressed higher levels of anxiety in the severe compared to the moderate condition (Ms = 2.85
vs. 2.12), F (1, 104) = 7.32, p = .008, ηp2 = .07. Hence, compared to participants assigned to the
moderate moral violation condition, participants felt higher levels of contempt, as well as
anxiety. As seen by the differences in effect size, however, the magnitude of the contempt effect
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was substantially larger than that seen with anxiety, as we show ahead, the effects of anxiety
disappeared once contempt was controlled for.
Spontaneous Emergence of Dehumanizing Language
As noted above, our participants almost always described the target group in negative
ways. However, our interest here was in the extent to which we would see the spontaneous (i.e.
unprompted) emergence of dehumanizing language as a function of experimental condition. As
predicted, dehumanizing language was more likely to emerge spontaneously from our
participants if the moral violation was extreme than if it was moderate. Moreover, this was true
regardless of whether we used the “strict” or “broad” criterion when constructing our
dehumanization index. Using the broad criterion, participants in the severe condition generated a
greater proportion of dehumanizing words (M = .20) compared to participants in the moderate
violation condition (M = .12), F (1, 104) = 9.26, p < .01, ηp2 = .08. A similar pattern was found
using the strict criterion (Ms = .08 vs. 04), F (1, 104) = 4.19, p < .05, ηp2 = .04.
Perceptions of Warmth and Competence by Condition
Participants in the severe violation condition inferred that the drug dealers were less
warm than those participants randomly assigned to the moderate condition (Ms = 19.86 vs.
30.76), F (1, 100) = 9.14, p < .01, ηp2 = .08. Furthermore, participants in the severe condition
rated the drug dealers as less competent, in comparison to those participants from the moderate
condition (M = 57.47 vs. 74.99), F (1,104) = 15.61, p <.001, ηp2 = .13.
Correlational analyses
Before we present our formal mediational analyses, it is useful to present an initial set of
analyses showing the relation among and between our main variables. We do so in Table 1.
The first row of this table, which conveys the point biserial correlation between the experimental
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condition and the other variables, simply confirms the implications of the AVOVAs, reported
above. Of greater interest, this table also shows that the strongest predictor of dehumanization
(regardless of whether the strict or broad criterion was used) was contempt (rs = .46 and .49,
respectively, both ps < .001) and that the magnitude of this relation was substantially greater than
any of the other potential predictors, including the experimental manipulation, anxiety, warmth,
or competence. The central role of contempt was more formally confirmed in the mediational
analyses, presented below.
Mediational Analysis
The results of the correlational matrix presented in Table 1 suggest the possibility of
mediation. We predicted that contempt would play the major mediational role, with the other
variables playing much less (or even no) role once contempt was controlled for. These
considerations were tested more formally using the PROCESS macro as proposed by Hayes
(2012). In our analyses, (a) condition was treated as the independent variable, (b) contempt,
warmth, and competence were treated as the three potential mediating variables with (c) the
dehumanization index treated as the dependent measure.3
Initial analyses revealed no significant effects of anxiety after controlling for contempt.
Indeed, although the overall pattern of our results were almost identical regardless of whether
anxiety was included or not in the model, the effects observed with contempt were, if anything,
slightly stronger after controlling for anxiety. Hence, in the analyses to be reported below, we
controlled for feelings of anxiety. However, because of the theoretical importance of warmth
and competence to the Harris and Fiske (2006) framework these two factors, along with
contempt, were included in the main analyses.

17

We conducted this analysis twice, once using the broad criterion, and again using the
strict criterion. In both cases, these analyses revealed a significant mediation effect involving
contempt. Hence, for the sake of avoiding redundancy, we present the results of our analyses for
the broad criterion only. The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 2. As suggested by this
figure, contempt emerged as a significant mediator of the relationship between the experimental
manipulation and dehumanization, b = .35, SE = .14, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .12--.68).
In contrast, although attributions of warmth and competence were clearly affected by the
experimental manipulation, these latter two factors did not play any role in terms of actually
mediating the emergence of dehumanization.
Supplemental Analysis
In our model, we conceptualized and measured contempt as a meaningful emotion in its
own right, involving a blending of anger and disgust. Although this approach is fully consistent
with the way that other theorists have conceptualized this emotion, it does raise the question of
whether our effects were mostly due to the effects of anger or mostly due to disgust.
Supplemental analyses using separate indices of anger (based on an average of angry, furious,
and outraged) revealed, on the one hand, a general pattern of mediation that was similar than the
results of the analyses as shown in Figure 2, b = .42, SE = .16, p < .05 (bias corrected interval:
.15--.79). However, any effects involving anger disappeared once disgust was controlled for, b =
.06, SE = .07, p > .05 (bias corrected interval: -0.02—0.27). In addition, the reverse was also
true. Taken on its own, a separate index of disgust (based on the average of repulsed and
disgusted) revealed a general pattern of mediation similar to that of our primary analyses, b =
.37, SE = .14, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .13--.70). However, the effects of disgust
disappeared once anger was controlled for. b = .01, SE = .03, p > .05 (bias corrected interval: -
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0.03--0.14). We also substituted the strict dehumanization index instead of the broad index, to
confirm that our effects were consistent, regardless of the dehumanization index used. Our
additional analyses indicated the same patterns mentioned above. In separate analyses, the
indirect effects of anger and disgust were statistically significant (p < .05). However, after
controlling for the other emotion, these indirect effects disappeared (p > .05).
We performed the same analytic approach over the next two experiments to see if anger
or, alternatively, disgust, were driving our effects. Similar to the supplementary analyses
highlighted above, each emotion on its own was able to produce a general pattern of mediation
for both of our dehumanization indices. However, these patterns disappeared after statistically
controlling for the other emotional index.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 consistently supported our contempt-dehumanization
framework in a number of ways. First, and perhaps most important, we showed that contempt
emerged as a strong mediator, insofar as the impact of the moral violation manipulation was
indirect. In other words, this manipulation did not have a direct effect on dehumanization;
rather, this was channeled through the affective experience of contempt. Moreover, after
controlling for contempt, inferences of low warmth, and low levels of competence, played no
significant role in driving dehumanization.
It is important to emphasize that our operationalization of dehumanization focused on the
spontaneous emergence of dehumanizing language. That is, we allowed participants free reign
to describe the target group in any way they wished, and we examined the extent to which
participants generated, without any prompting by us, examples of dehumanizing language. In
other words, aside from the fact that participants almost always generated negative descriptors in
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the word generation task, we were interested in the extent to which truly dehumanizing language
began to creep into their descriptions.
As the observant reader may have already noted, the average proportion of dehumanizing
language was relatively low. In our view, this represents a telling feature of dehumanization. In
particular, even in the context of an anonymous survey, our participants seemed to be telling us,
in essence, that truly dehumanizing language goes well beyond mere negativity. It is true, of
course, that dehumanizing language is negative and, as we have noted, there may not be a strict
boundary between what is dehumanizing and what is not. At the same time, our data show that
people do not use such terms lightly, as they seem to reserve these terms for the most egregious
violations of moral standards. In our view, this highlights an important feature of dehumanizing
language, the fact that it appears to be reserved for the most truly horrific actions of others, and
even then people seem to use such terms sparingly. This, in our view, highlights the possibly
unique power and “punch” of dehumanizing language. People do not often use such terms, but
when they do, it serves as a marker of truly unacceptable actions of others.
In the context of our model, the central mediator of contempt represents a blending of
anger and disgust. Our operationalization of contempt is similar to that of previous theorists
(Plutchik, 1980) but it does raise the possibility that the mediational effect of contempt was
actually due to the activation of disgust, rather than anger. Or, one could also make the argument
that our results reflected the role of anger, as opposed to disgust. As noted in our supplemental
analyses, however, neither of these alternatives was supported. Our supplemental analyses found
separate (albeit weaker) indirect effects for analyses that included either anger or disgust related
items into our multiple mediation model (These models included the same composite measures
of warmth and competence, as discussed previously.) However, upon controlling for the other
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emotion (e.g., including anger as a mediator and controlling for disgust), neither emotional
measure was found to statistically influence the utilization of dehumanizing language, all p’s >
.25.
EXPERIMENT 2
The overall goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate and extend the findings obtained in
Experiment 1 with a completely different target group. In particular, although we again
manipulated the severity of the moral violation, this was done in the context of unscrupulous
Wall Street investors who were, or were not, described as intentionally preying on unsuspected
elderly people in order to bilk them out of their retirement funds. As in the case of Experiment
1, we tested a mediational model such that this manipulation was predicted to trigger strong
levels of contempt and that such emotion would, in turn, be predictive of the emergence of
dehumanizing language.
Our desire to focus on a different group was primarily driven by the need to show that
our previous results were not due to some idiosyncratic property associated with drug dealers
and, hence, an important goal of Experiment 2 was to demonstrate the generalizability of our
theoretical model. In focusing on Wall Street investors, we also wished to provide further
evidence that dehumanization can be applied towards highly competent (i.e. skilled) people. In
other words, Wall Street investors may be many things, but they are not incompetent. Indeed, it
is the very fact that people might use their finely honed skills in order to achieve nefarious aims
(e.g. bilking senior citizens) that can drive the emergence of dehumanization in the first place.4
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Method
Participants
A total of 101 participants (47 Male, 48 Female, gender was not reported for six
participants) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in our study for 50 cents.
Experimental Manipulation.
Participants were randomly assigned and given unlimited time to read one of two 300word newspaper articles about dishonest Wall Street investors. For participants in the extreme
moral violation condition, the target article described a group of investors who intentionally
target senior citizens for the sake of making a profit. Participants in the moderate moral
violation condition were given a very similar description, except that the group being targeted
was described as wealthy/affluent couples. The complete description of these two versions is
provided in Appendix C.
Word Generation Task
After reading the randomly assigned article presented to them, all participants completed
the same word generation task as used in our previous experiments. Similar to our previous
experiments, we created both the broad and strict versions of the dehumanization indices.
Assessment of Emotion
Immediately after providing their open-ended response to the article, participants were
presented with the same affective task from Experiment 1. As in our first study, we formed two
separate emotional composites, including an index of (a) contempt (angry, furious, outraged,
repulsed, disgusted) (alpha = .92) as well as (b) anxiety (nervous, anxious, fearful, and terrified),
alpha = .85).
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Results
Initial analyses revealed a general pattern that was similar to that of Experiment 1. In
particular, participants assigned to the extreme moral violation condition expressed higher levels
of contempt compared to those assigned to the moderate moral violation condition, Ms = 4.96 vs.
4.19), F (1, 99) = 9.66, p =.002, ηp2 = .09. Further analyses revealed a marginal effect of
anxiety, Ms = 2.78 vs. 2.31), F (1, 99) = 3.73, p = .06, ηp2 = .04, but this effect disappeared after
controlling for contempt. Finally, as in Experiment 1, we generally found more evidence of
dehumanizing language in the extreme (vs. moderate) moral violation condition, and this was
true regardless of whether we used the broad criterion, (Ms = .18 vs. .11), F (1, 99) = 6.08, p =
.015, ηp2 = .06, or the strict criterion, (Ms = .09 vs. .05), F (1,99) = 5.97, p = .016, ηp2 = .06.
Mediational Analysis
To examine the possibility of mediation, we again used Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS macro,
with condition as the independent variable, contempt as the mediating variable, and our
dependent variable as the dehumanization index. These analyses once again yielded a very
similar pattern of results regardless of which dehumanization was used and hence in Figure 3 we
present the results from the broad criterion only. As seen here, our results strongly replicate and
extend the findings obtained in Experiment 1, showing a significant mediational effect of
contempt, b = .24, SE = .13, p < .05, bias corrected interval: .05--.59.
Discussion
Experiment 2 provides further evidence for our moral violation postulate, such that
higher levels of contempt, as a result of our experimental manipulation, lead to increased
dehumanization, regardless of whether a strict or broad criterion of dehumanization was used.
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These results provide a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 with a different group (Wall
Street investors), providing evidence for the stability and generalizability of our findings.
EXPERIMENT 3
Across the two studies reported thus far, we have provided consistent support for the
proposed mediational process (moral violation ! contempt ! dehumanization). Although
we view such findings as important in their own right, their importance would be heightened still
further if we could show that this process has other tangible ramifications, including people’s
intentions to engage in specific behaviors. In other words, we wished to examine the possible
“downstream” consequences of the contempt-dehumanization process, with a particular interest
in how these mechanisms might be relevant to people’s intentions to punish the perceived wrong
doing. To this end, we employed a set of procedures and materials that were generally similar to
that of Experiment 1, except that we added a battery of behavioral intention items after our
assessment of emotion, to assess participants’ intentions to inflict tangible punishment on the
drug dealers in question. These items were meant to assess a range of punitive actions toward
the drug dealers described in the story, ranging from the number of years the moral violators
should be imprisoned for, support for the death penalty if it were “on the table,” and whether one
would personally engage in punishment if one saw these crimes being committed.
Method
Participants
A total of 125 participants (56 Male, 66 Female, gender not reported for three
participants) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in our study for 50 cents.
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Materials and Procedure
The manipulation of moral violation (moderate vs. severe) was the same as that used in
Experiment 1. As in our earlier study, participants completed the word generation task
immediately after reading the assigned passage. All participants then completed the same
affective items from the previous experiments. To assess contempt and anxiety-related emotions,
we formed two indices, an index for contempt (angry, furious, outraged, repulsed, disgusted)
(alpha = .95), and anxiety (nervous, anxious, fearful, worried) (alpha = .88)
Punishment Index
Immediately after the mood inventory, participants answered several questions indicating
their desire to punish the drug dealers mentioned in the story. There were four questions in total.
The first question probed participants’ intentions in terms of the length of a prison term, if they
had the opportunity to make this determination on their own “If these drug dealers are guilty of
crimes for which they have been charged, how long do you believe their sentence should be, in
years?” Immediately following this question, participants were provided with a box and were
given the opportunity to write any number that best represented the number of years that they
would recommend.
The remaining three questions consisted of items to which participants were asked to
express their relative agreement or disagreement: One of these items pertained to a global desire
for justice, “These drug dealers deserve to be severely punished for the harm they've done to
society,” with a second item asking participants to simulate what sort of decision that they would
make as a member of the jury, Suppose that you were on the jury for one of the drug dealers in
the story, and that this person was found guilty, “If so, and if the death penalty were an option,
how likely is it that would you advocate for the death penalty?” The third item asked participants

25

whether they, themselves, would initiate acts of aggression towards the members of this group:
If you saw drug dealers committing the acts mentioned in the story, to what extent would you
personally consider committing violence towards them? For each of these three items,
participants were asked to indicate their opinion towards the statement by selecting any number
between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating greater agreement/endorsement of the item in
question.
Although these four items were asking conceptually distinct questions, initial analyses
revealed that response on all four items were highly correlated with one another (all rs > .30, ps
< .001). In light of this overlap, we formed an overall composite of intended punishment on the
basis of an average of all four items. (Prior to forming this composite, we first performed a log
transformation on the “years in prison” item to reduce positive skew, and we then converted all
four items to z scores.) Higher and lower numbers on this index (alpha = .81) thus indicate a
relatively high vs. low desire for punishment, respectively.
Results
Initial analyses generally revealed the same pattern observed in Experiments 1 and 2. In
particular, participants assigned to the extreme moral violation condition expressed higher levels
of contempt compared to those assigned to the moderate moral violation condition, (Ms = 4.34
vs. 3.10), F (1, 123 ) = 19.13 p < .001, ηp2 = .14 Further analyses revealed an effect of anxiety,
(Ms =3.02 vs. 2.38), F (1, 123) = 6.62, p = .01, ηp2 = .05, but this effect disappeared after
controlling for contempt. We also found more evidence of dehumanizing language in the
extreme (vs. moderate) moral violation condition, and this was true regardless of whether we
used the broad criterion, (Ms = .20 vs. .14), F (1, 123) = 5.11, p = .03, ηp2 = .04, or the strict
criterion, (Ms = .10 vs. .05), F (1, 123) = 3.78, p = .05, ηp2 = .03. Additional analyses also
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revealed greater intentions for punishment in the severe compared to the moderate moral
violation condition, (Ms = 0.22 vs. -0.24), F (1,123) = 11.11, p = .001, ηp2 = .08.
Mediational Analyses I: Dehumanization as Criterion
To show the parallelism with Experiments 1 and 2, it is useful at the outset to show
support for our model with respect to the predicted relationships involving the experimental
manipulation, feelings of contempt, and the two dehumanization indices. (In these analyses, we
temporarily omitted the punishment index from consideration.) The results of these analyses,
which were again generated by Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS macro, are shown in Figure 4 for the
broad criterion of the dehumanization index. (As in our two previous studies, a very similar
pattern of results was obtained with the strict criterion.) As seen in Figure 4, our findings nicely
converge on the implications of our two earlier studies, showing a significant mediational effect
of contempt, b = .27, SE = .12, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .09--.62).
Mediational Analyses II: Punishment Index as Criterion
In these analyses, punishment (rather than dehumanization) was now treated as the
criterion variable. As such, these analyses were conducted in order to determine whether
contempt, as well as dehumanization, served to mediate the effect of the experimental
manipulation on punishment. The result of this analysis is displayed in Figure 5. Once again, a
generally similar pattern of results was found regardless of whether the broad or strict criterion
was used and hence we report the analyses for the broad criterion only.
Formal tests of mediation revealed two significant effects. First, contempt served as a
mediator in its own right, b = .19, SE = .07, p < .05, bias corrected interval: .07--.35. Second, we
also found evidence of serial mediation, such that contempt as well as dehumanization served to
mediate the effect of the experimental manipulation on punishment (condition ! contempt !
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dehumanization ! punishment index), b = .02, SE = .02, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .00-.07). We conducted this analysis once again, but instead of using the broad dehumanization
index, we instead opted for the strict dehumanization index. Analyses suggested no substantive
differences between the effects found using the broad index or the strict index.
Discussion
Experiment 3 provides further evidence of our contempt-dehumanization framework,
such that the indirect effect of contempt was a statistically significant predictor of
dehumanization. In addition, we were also interested in whether our experimental manipulation
was able to systematically predict motivation to punish norm violators. Here too, we found a
conditional difference, such that participants randomly assigned to the severe condition had a
greater desire to punish norm violators, in comparison to participants in the moderate condition.
Participants in the severe condition supported longer prison sentences, increased support for the
death penalty, and greater vigilantism against the drug dealers mentioned in the story.
We were also interested in whether our contempt-dehumanization model was able to
predict the propensity to punish the norm violators from the story (see Appendix B). We found
that both the indirect pathways for both contempt alone and contempt to dehumanization were
statistically significant. These results suggest that there are downstream consequences to
dehumanization, in the form of a greater willingness for punishing norm violators. Participants
that felt greater contempt would be more likely to categorize the drug dealers as non-human.
This categorization, in turn, led to an increased motivation to punish the nefarious drug dealers
depicted in the story.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous models of dehumanization have tended to focus on affect as a consequence of
dehumanization. That is, previous models have focused on the tendency for people to infer that
dehumanized groups/individuals lack the capacity to feel the same kinds of emotional
experiences as others (especially, members of the ingroup; Haslam et al., 2008; see also Leyens
et al., 2000). The focus of the present research was different. In particular, we were focused on
the role of affect as a mediator of dehumanization. In other words, when perceivers dehumanize
others, what kinds of affective experiences are driving the dehumanization process?
Across three experiments, we found consistent support for the for our contemptdehumanization framework. According to our model, severe norm violations can trigger the
dehumanization process, but does so indirectly, via the activation of contempt. We provided
support for our model across two domains of norm violations, including drug dealers that
intentionally target young children (Experiments 1 and 3) as well as unscrupulous Wall Street
investors that deliberately scam their elderly clients. To be sure, we are hardly the first to suggest
that the process of dehumanization is likely to involve aversive reactions toward the targeted
group. To our knowledge, however, we are the first to conduct formal tests of affective
mediation. In so doing, we provide new insight into the specific role of affect in driving the
dehumanization process.
Comparison of our Framework with Previous Models of Dehumanization
As noted earlier, we are certainly not the only researchers highlighting the role of
emotion in dehumanization. For example, Harris and Fiske (2006) suggest a relationship
between moral violations and contempt/disgust, by claiming that past moral violations are likely
to contribute to increased feelings of contempt and disgust. These repeated violations may

29

gradually shift repeated moral violators to the low-competence, low warmth quadrant of the
stereotype content model. As a result, the quadrant itself is typically considered central to
dehumanization. On a related note, the authors claim that this quadrant itself is most likely to be
associated with feelings of disgust/contempt, as several researchers utilizing the stereotype
content model has exhibited (Harris & Fiske, 2006, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Cuddy, Fiske, &
Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). This is evident in Harris and Fiske’s (2006) model,
as stimuli from this quadrant were associated with feelings of disgust for over 60 percent of the
cases (see Harris and Fiske, 2006 for details).
Although we agree that feelings of disgust/contempt are more likely to occur in this
quadrant (in comparison to the other three quadrants), it is not the properties of the quadrant per
se that is likely driving these effects. Rather, we believe that contempt is the most proximal
determinant of dehumanization. In other words, the driving force behind these effects is a
byproduct of the emotion that participants feel towards the group, and not perceptions of the
group’s warmth and competence.
In summary, we believe that the Harris and Fiske (2006) conceptualization of
dehumanization as a function of low warmth and low competence is probably too restrictive. If
perceptions of low competence and warmth were necessary for dehumanization, then it would be
unlikely to generate dehumanizing language to social groups that fall outside of these
boundaries. However, our findings from Experiment Two seem to run somewhat contrary to
Harris and Fiske’s (2006) model, since the Wall Street investors committing the moral violation
were described in dehumanized terms just as frequently as their low competence, low warmth
counterparts. Since this group was dehumanized just as much as the drug dealers from the first
experiment, it stands to reason that perceptions of competence are an unlikely component in
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dehumanization. Furthermore, our results from Experiment One suggest that warmth, too, plays
no direct role in the dehumanization process.
Two departures of our research vis a vis previous work should be noted. First, participants
were asked to spontaneously generate ten words to describe the moral violators about which they
read. The coding of spontaneous language—where participants were asked to come up with these
words on their own—may be a significant advantage over explicit ratings of dehumanizing
attitudes. For instance, asking participants to generate Likert-style ratings of moral violators’
level of humanity might induce demand effects. However, since participants did not make
explicit ratings, and instead generated words, we were able to alleviate such concerns.
Second, the use of a nontraditional control condition offers some benefits and, of course,
some disadvantages. A traditional control condition might have participants write about the
mundane events in their life or perhaps about a different social group that does not commit a
moral violation. Although the use of such a condition may serve as a more effective emotional
baseline, its use may introduce confounds. For example, participants that are asked to read about
a different social group may engender feelings of contempt, which would likely increase the use
of dehumanizing language. Instead, by using the same social group and simply varying the
severity of the moral violation, we were able to circumvent this issue. Moreover, the use of a
moderate violation committed by the same group of moral violators enables us to draw more
confident conclusions about the implications of our data.
Caveats and Directions for Future Research
Although the work presented here provides a foundational framework for the
dehumanization process, our findings raise some considerations for future research in this area.
For instance, the current research focused on social groups, and not individuals. We believe that
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the kind of dehumanization processes revealed here can occur when people are judging a
particular individual who is perceived to have strongly violated relevant norms. For example,
when a romantic partner lies about sexual infidelities, or when a business partner cons one out of
their financial assets, we believe the stipulated dehumanization processes may also be likely to
occur, when describing the moral violator in question.
Future research should also consider examining the cognitive accessibility of
dehumanizing terms when one or more moral violations occur. Although it is true that the
spontaneous use of dehumanizing language is relatively infrequent, we believe that social
desirability may explain its infrequent use. To more directly test the cognitive accessibility of
dehumanizing language, participants could conceivably be assigned to conditions in which they
are more likely to experience feelings of contempt in comparison to those that are not. Our
belief is that those assigned to the severe violation condition will exhibit greater cognitive
accessibility of dehumanizing terms in comparison to the control condition. Current research in
this area is promising, as recent work by Buckels & Trapnell (2013) find that being primed with
disgust-related concepts led to greater accessibility of dehumanizing concepts. Our lab plans to
further examine this paradigm using implicit measures of dehumanization, to determine whether
a feeling of contempt facilitates the accessibility of dehumanizing language.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we believe that the contempt-dehumanization framework offers major
insight into how dehumanization occurs. Previous dehumanization research has examined the
perceived emotional abilities of the targets of dehumanization (Leyens et al., 2001), citing that
dehumanized targets are perceived as lacking the ability to evoke secondary emotions. However,
in our case, we are interested in whether an emotional signature of the person carrying out the
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dehumanization exists. The data presented in this article provides support for our postulate that
feelings of contempt by the perceiver are at the heart of dehumanization. We hope that future
research advances and clarifies the dehumanization framework, so that subsequent work can gain
insight into how the process of dehumanization may drive judgment and behavior towards social
groups as well as the people who belong to them.
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FOOTNOTES
1

Our strict dehumanization index was positively skewed across all three studies (all

studies skew > 2.0). Thus, prior to formal analyses, we reduced the skew of this index through a
log transformation procedure (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). In the three studies with high positive
skew, this procedure substantially reduced skew (all studies skew < 1.0). Thus, formal analyses
for these three studies were conducted on the transformed indices. However, for ease of
interpretability, the values to be presented in the text and in Table 1 are presented in their
original (non-transformed) values.
2

Experiment 1 did not reveal any gender differences for any of our analyses. Experiment

2 contained one significant gender effect, such that female (vs. male) felt greater levels of
anxiety. Experiment 3 revealed only one gender effect, such that, overall female participants felt
greater contempt than men. However, neither of these effects involved the experimental
manipulation and hence do not qualify the implications of our conclusions. Hence, in all of the
analyses to follow, we collapse over gender.
3

We used this analytic approach over the classic mediational analysis as proposed by

Baron and Kenny (1986) for four reasons. First, the first step of the Baron and Kenny mediation
model requires a statistically significant relationship between our experimental condition and our
dehumanization indices. Although this is true for almost all of the mediational analyses presented
below, Experiment 3’s conditional effect (using the strict dehumanization index) fell outside of
conventional levels of statistical significance. Second, the Baron and Kenny approach does not
allow for covariation. In particular, throughout all of the mediational analyses performed in this
article, the emotional effects of anxiety were covaried from our analyses. Third, this approach
does not allow for more complicated analyses, such as the multiple mediation analyses presented
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in Experiment One and the serial mediation analyses presented in Experiment Three. Fourth, the
Baron and Kenny (as well as the Sobel Test, 1982) assume that the product of the indirect affect
is normally distributed. To circumvent issues of normal distribution, the statistic analysis tool
offered by Hayes allows us to bootstrap these indirect effects.
4

This assumption was verified in a small pilot study (N = 15) run prior to conducting

Experiment 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of our Wall Street
newspaper article (article details are presented in Appendix C as well as the methods section to
follow). After reading the randomly assigned article, participants were asked how competent
they perceived the Wall Street professionals on a scale of 0 (Not at all Competent) to 100
(Highly Competent). Overall, our grand mean (M = 52.67) indicated that participants saw the
Wall Street professionals as moderately competent. We also investigated if perceptions of the
Wall Street professionals’ competence varied by condition. Perceptions of competence trended
in the same direction of Experiment One. Participants randomly assigned to the severe condition
rated the moral violators as less competent (M = 45.71) in comparison to the moderate condition
(M = 58.75), although, these differences did not approach conventional levels of statistical
significance, F (1,13) < 1.0, p = .50.
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Appendix A: Dehumanization Wor d List

Strict Criterion
Garbage
Demon*
Dirt bags
Trash
Scum*
Inhumane
Bitches
Trash*
Bottom Feeders
Vampires
Blood Suckers
Leeches
Animals
Pigs
Predators
Snakes
Rats
Parasites
Monsters
Devils
Jackals
Worms
Leeches
Inhuman
Not human
Shit
Crap
Dirt*/Dirty
Prey
Subhuman

Additional Items included under broad criterio n
Vipers
Lamprey
Waste
Cesspool
Weasels
Pond Scum
Rapscallions
Scavengers
Douchebag
Jackasses
Maggots
Shit Rooster
Venomous

Heartless
Spineless
Soulless
Immoral
Careless
Uncaring
Ruthless
Shameless
Emotionless
Low Morals
Cold-hearted
Conscienceless
Black Hearted
Unethical
Unscrupulous
Amoral
Valueless
Lack of Morals
Unfeeling
Jackasses
Moral-less
Morally bankrupt
Slimy
Filthy
Base
Worthless
Scoundrels
Impaired
Degenerates
Antisocial
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Appendix B: Stimuli for Sever e (Top) and Moder ate (Bottom) mor al violation conditions in Exper iments One and Thr ee
Severe

Kansas City - They're colorful, flavorful and they might appeal to your kids. But they're also dangerous street drugs. Without drug
users, drug dealers would go out of business. Because there needs to be a demand for the illegal drugs they produce and traffic, dealers
are continually looking to attract more "customers" -- to get more people "hooked on their junk."" And among drug dealers there are no
qualms about target-marketing kids," says COMBAT Assistant Director of Operations Vince Ferris, a 30-year veteran of the Kansas
City, Missouri Police Department.
"They're trying to create the next generation of addicts -- their new customers -- by creating 'products' made to appeal specifically to
children." Here are just three examples: Ecstasy pills shaped like cartoon characters, methamphetamine packaged like candy and
marijuana-laced treats. “That's purposeful,” says Ferris, “It’s why they package drugs that way. They make it so it doesn't seem so
harmful. It’s scary to see that because we're having more youth come in that are minimizing the effects drugs can have on them." But
its use has gone up. Last year alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents intercepted a half-million tablets in Washington
State, mostly at the border.
The Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began raising awareness about Ecstasy tablets shaped like Snoopy and Dora the Explorer
in a June 2009 bulletin issued to law enforcement agencies across the nation. A month later, a U.S. Border Patrol dog discovered more
than 46 pounds of the pills stuffed in a suitcase on a bus in Harlingen, Texas. How many pills would that have been? Consider
this: Approximately 200 ecstasy pills, seized in another Texas arrest, tipped the scales at around 63 grams -- about one-tenth of a pound.

Moderate
Kansas City - They're “healthy”, flavorful and they might appeal to Young professionals. But they're also dangerous street drugs.
Without drug users, drug dealers would go out of business. Because there needs to be a demand for the illegal drugs they produce and
traffic, dealers are continually looking to improve product -- to get more people "hooked on their junk."" And among drug dealers
there are no qualms about using," says COMBAT Assistant Director of Operations Vince Ferris, a 30-year veteran of the Kansas City,
Missouri Police Department.
"They're trying to create the next generation of addicts -- their new customers -- by creating 'products' made to appeal adults with
expendable income. Here are just two examples: Ecstasy pills shaped like celebrities and marijuana-laced health bars. “That's
purposeful,” says Ferris, “It’s why they package drugs that way. They make it so it doesn't seem so harmful. It’s scary to see that
because we're having more adults come in that are minimizing the effects drugs can have on them." But its use has gone up. Last year
alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents intercepted a half-million tablets in Washington State, mostly at the border.
The Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began raising awareness about Ecstasy tablets shaped like Hollywood celebrities in a
June 2009 bulletin issued to law enforcement agencies across the nation. A month later, a U.S. Border Patrol dog discovered more than
46 pounds of the pills stuffed in a suitcase on a bus in Harlingen, Texas. How many pills would that have been? Consider
this: Approximately 200 ecstasy pills, seized in another Texas arrest, tipped the scales at around 63 grams -- about one-tenth of a pound.
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Appendix C: Stimuli for Sever e (Top) and Moder ate (Bottom) mor al violation conditions in Exper iment Two
Severe
NEW YORK –Shady Wall Street Investors don't have to bilk billions to do real harm. In just the last two weeks, The Associated
Press reported on at least a dozen cases in which investors were accused of stealing, on average, just over $416 million from the
unsuspecting elderly, people typically reliant on social security. Their alleged frauds touched retirement-aged couples in as many as
22 states.
Senior citizens are especially vulnerable to con artists peddling Ponzi schemes and other dead-end deals. “Most victims are older and
many of them have cognitive impairment,” said Denise Voigt Crawford, the Texas State securities commissioner. The problem is
going to get worse as baby boomers age, she said, adding that one new twist is many of the newest swindlers are also elderly.
Even worse, many of these investors are well aware of this cognitive impairment and deliberately target elderly couples as a result,
since this age bracket highlights a highly susceptible section of the American population. "There's nothing worse than seeing an
elderly couple who's been scammed out of $50,000 or $60,000 or $70,000 - oftentimes their life savings," said Michael Kappas,
CEO of Apprisen Financial Advocates in Columbus, Ohio.
Seniors who live alone may be the most vulnerable - the "elderly widow" is an investor’s classic target. And the rapid migration of
seniors online may expose this population to even more fraud. Nielsen estimates the number of Internet users age 65 and older shot
up 55 percent in the last five years.

Moderate
NEW YORK – Shady Wall Street Investors don’t have to profit from regular Americans to do real harm. In just the last two
weeks, The Associated Press reported on at least a dozen cases in which investors were accused of stealing from wealthy
Americans, mostly upper class families, whose net worth average in upwards of ten million dollars.
These wealthy couples are not new to investing, but aren’t completely competent in some of the slight changes that the Securities
and Exchange Commission has implemented since the 2008 stock market crisis. “Most of the wealthy couples are experienced
investors, trying to gain money using investing tricks that worked years before the recession, with trust that their Wall Street
investor partners would recognize that ” said Denise Houghman Johnston, the Arkansas State securities commissioner. The problem
is going to get worse before it gets better, with investment knowledge needing to improve before these wealthy Americans are able
to make some of their money back.
It’s unfortunate to see a wealthy couple who's been fooled out of $50,000 or $60,000 or $70,000 - oftentimes their down payment
for a summer condo or a new car," said Michael Kappas, CEO of Apprisen Financial Advocates in Columbus, Ohio. Wealthy
couples beginning to reinvest in the stock market may face a bit of a learning curve to these new regulations, with hopes that their
financial investors instruct them of the changes that have been made.
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Table 1: Correlational Analyses (Experiment 1)

Measure
1. Condition (0 = control; 1 = experimental)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-

.20*

.28**

-

2. Dehumanization Index—Strict
3. Dehumanization Index—Broad
4. Anxiety

(6)

(7)

.28** .38***

-.28**

-.36***

.72***

.17†

.46***

-.32**

-.25**

-

.20*

.49*** -.41***

-.24*

.63***

-.26**

-.05

-

-.50***

-.22*

-

.24*

-

5. Contempt
6. Warmth
7. Competence

†

(4)

(5)

-

p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001.
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Contempt-Dehumanization Framework

Infer ences of negative
per sonality qualities

Moral
Violation

Contempt

Dehumanization

Additional negative
feelings/attitudes

Note: dotted arrows represent pathways that are postulated to be weak after statistically controlling for contempt.
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Figure 2: Experiment One Multiple Mediation Analysis of the Broad Dehumanization Index

Total effect (c): b = .758 (.276)**
Dir ect effect (c’): b = .223 (.267)

b = -9.08 (3.68)*

Mor al Violation
(0 = Moder ate, 1 = Sever e)

b = .012 (.007)

War mth

b = .389 (.097)***

b = .90 (.28)**
Dir ect effect (c’):

Contempt

Dir ect effect (c’): b =

Dehumanization-Br oad

Competence
b = -17.14 (4.64)***

b = -.004 (.005)

Dir ect effect (c’): b =
Note: Moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which drug dealers young professionals vs. children,
respectively (see text). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 3: Experiment Two Mediational Analysis of the Broad Dehumanization Index

Moral Violation
(0 = Moderate, 1 = Severe

Contempt
b = 0.58 (0.23) *

Dehumanization-Br oad
b = 0.42 (0.11)**

Total effect (c): b = 0.92 (0.30) **
Dir ect effect (c`): b = 0.68 (0.29)*
Note: Moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which Wall Street investors targeted affluent vs. elderly
couples, respectively (see text). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 4: Experiment Three Mediational Analysis of the Broad Dehumanization Index

Moral Violation
(0 = Moderate, 1 = Severe

Contempt

Dehumanization-Br oad
b = 0.35 (0.11)**

b = 0.78 (0.23) ***

Total effect (c): b = 0.73 (0.28) **
Dir ect effect (c`): b = 0.46 (0.28)
Note: moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which drug dealers targeted young professionals vs. children,
respectively (see text). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001
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Figure 5: Experiment Three Serial Mediation Analyses of Punishment Index

b = 0.24 (0.05) ***

Moral Violation
(0 = Moderate,
1 = Severe)

Contempt
b = 0.78 (0.23)**

Dehumanization-Br oad
b = 0.35 (0.11) **

Punishment
b = 0.09 (0.04) *

Total effect (c): b = 0.46 (0.14) **
Dir ect effect (c`): b = 0.06 (0.12)

Note: moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which drug dealers targeted young professionals vs. children,
respectively (see text). The absence of an explicit pathway between variable indicates no explicit relationship between the variables in
question. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001
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